Beyond economics: the geopolitical importance of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership by unknown
209 1 3
 EuropEan ViEw (2015) 14:209–216
Doi 10.1007/s12290-015-0376-0
Beyond economics: the 
geopolitical importance 
of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership
Pavlina Pavlova 
published online: 30 november 2015 
© The author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract with the Transatlantic Trade and investment partnership, Europe has a 
decisive opportunity to define the direction of future global trade. However, conclud-
ing the biggest agreement of its kind seems to be trying the internal unity of the union. 
a wave of protests has swept across Europe as many fear the hidden costs behind 
regulatory cooperation with our neighbours across the atlantic. Getting sceptics on 
board will require more than economic reasoning. The hidden value of the free trade 
agreement is its geopolitical importance and the historic opportunity it offers for the 
west. Sealing the deal with the uS would strengthen Euro-atlantic cooperation, counter 
the influence of China, diminish European dependency on russia’s energy imports and 
promote the western economic model. Should the negotiations fail, mutual blame and 
internal frustration will isolate the Eu.
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Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and investment partnership, better known as TTip, is a trade 
deal between the world’s two biggest economies—the Eu and the uS. By lowering 
non-tariff barriers and setting common rules, it promises to bring a post-crisis boost 
to Europe and refresh the old alliance. But this Euro-atlantic partnership also has its 
detractors. The critics are few but they have been making their voices clearly heard ever 
since the European Commission received the mandate for negotiations in July 2013. 
Despite the Commission’s hard work to bust the myths surrounding the agreement, it 
seems to be easier for people to unite in opposition to it. This year dozens of protests 
have taken place across Europe and anti-TTip campaigns have mushroomed on social 
media. in addition, Julian assange’s wikileaks has publicly claimed that the deal lacks 
transparency. The news leaks organisation has launched a campaign to crowd-source 
a €100,000 reward for ‘Europe’s most wanted secret’—the prize will go to anyone who 
can secure information on TTip (Wikileaks 2015). The reasons for such criticism of the 
deal are eclectic—from a general anti-uS attitude, to claims that the deal will empower 
multinational corporations and fears of losing control over the high standards of food on 
the European market. Scaremongering and misinformation are unavoidable obstacles 
when discussing far-reaching supranational agreements—and the bigger the agree-
ment, the greater the fear. with the uS and the Eu accounting for almost 45 % of global 
trade and 60 % of global investment flows (Berger 2014), TTip would become the big-
gest trade deal of its kind.
There are three broad areas being negotiated under the Eu–uS trade deal: market 
access for businesses, regulatory cooperation and international rules to address global 
challenges. The two economic super-blocs have one of the most integrated markets in 
the world and tariffs between them are already very low at less than 3 % (European 
Commission 2015a). The crucial part of the agreement is therefore its second pillar, 
which aims to reduce non-tariff barriers and standardise regulations. Coherence in stand-
ards on both shores of the atlantic would increase efficiency, cut bureaucratic costs and 
have major economic benefits. it would also become a powerful tool to ensure that such 
standards are advanced globally, thus helping to promote the spillover of western-style 
trade rules. But neither ‘regulatory cooperation’ nor ‘liberalising trade’ seem to be popular 
enough topics to take the lead in public discussions. There is a shortage of empirical 
data available to help European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström get the detrac-
tors of TTip on her side. its critics say there is a lot to lose and little to gain (The Econo-
mist 2015). instead of an economic narrative, those advocating a comprehensive deal 
should focus on storytelling that makes it easier to understand what is at stake and gives 
the potential geopolitical impact of the agreement a prominent role.
Trade deals and strategic gridlocks
Trade deals have never been more political than today. regional deals have gained 
prominence as a result of the endless stagnation of the wTo’s Doha round, which 
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seems to have launched a new era in trade deals around the globe. But while TTip is 
regional in its initial scale, the hope is there that it would subsequently lead in some 
way to the relaunch of multilateralism. as we have witnessed, agreements are difficult 
to reach because of the greatly differing standards between the west and other major 
actors, whether China, russia or india. Thus achieving a far-reaching deal between the 
western economic powers, which includes an accord on high social and environmental 
standards, would act as an incentive for others to reach such a level.
The current driver of trade agreements is the uS, which is working on several historic 
deals, of which the most colossal are TTip, the Trans-pacific partnership (Tpp) and the 
Trade in Services agreement (TiSa). Due to its similar size—comprising roughly 40 % 
of the global economy, TTip is often compared with the Tpp. The Tpp is the economic 
element of uS president obama’s strategic ‘pivot to asia’ that came about in response 
to the growing economic power of China and the corresponding expansion of its foreign 
policy. The trade deal has been negotiated between the uS and 11 countries around 
the pacific rim, including Japan, australia, Canada, Mexico and Malaysia. Together 
with the conclusion of TTip, it will establish the two largest free trade blocs in the world 
(wildau 2015b; Freytag et al. 2014; Schuette 2014). according to the uS Secretary 
of Commerce penny pritzker (2014), the Tpp and TTip will together cover more than 
60 % of global GDp. The Tpp, which was concluded after more than five years of nego-
tiations, is to be the biggest trade agreement since the creation of the wTo in 1994 
(wildau 2015b). The reaching of an agreement on the Tpp also puts new pressure on 
European negotiators to conclude TTip under the obama administration, as some of 
the front-runners for presidential candidacy are more hesitant about the deal.
However, the Eu is also progressing with regional and bilateral trade pacts. The Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade agreement with Canada was finalised recently and 
it is perceived by many as the precursor to TTip (Korteweg 2015). in addition, Com-
missioner Malmström announced the new Eu trade strategy, ‘Trade for all’, in octo-
ber 2015, which is intended to focus on further economic collaboration with asian and 
pacific nations. The practicalities are still foggy, but the Commission will ask for a man-
date to negotiate free trade agreements with australia and new Zealand. part of the 
new strategy is to update already existing agreements with Turkey, Mexico and Chile 
(European Commission 2015b). Even though the details remain blurry, diversifying 
and strengthening existing trade deals looks likely to be the general direction for future 
development under this strategy.
The winners of transatlantic cooperation
a trade agreement between the world’s most important strategic partners is a logical 
step forward as the uS is a natural partner for Europe. Despite attempts to shift atten-
tion towards asia, the uS remains highly engaged in the old Continent. Since 2000, uS 
investment in the netherlands has been more than 12 times higher than total uS invest-
ment in China. at the same time, the uS has invested more in italy than in india and 
the uS’s investment stake in ireland is 40 % bigger than the total amount of uS capital 
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invested in all of South america (Hamilton and Quinlan 2015). Liberalising trade and 
finding a common ground in mutually recognised standards would massively strengthen 
this development and secure the future of Euro-atlantic cooperation. Should the TTip 
be concluded, it would bring a breath of fresh air to the old alliance. on the external 
level, TTip has considerable potential to send a strong message to expansionist global 
actors that could become more aggressive if the transatlantic partners were to pull back.
The even greater strategic advantage is the historic opportunity to take part in setting 
global trade rules for others. Findings ways to establish multilateral cooperation with the 
rising powers has not been easy for western-based institutions. The failure of the Doha 
round and the founding of the asian infrastructure investment Bank and the BriCS 
Bank by Brazil, russia, india, China and South africa as alternatives to the world Bank 
prove that the west has been losing ground (wildau 2015a). a high level of regula-
tory convergence between the two largest consumer markets would set the standard for 
global trade practices and put pressure on others to follow suit. as a result, it would pro-
vide effective leverage for future negotiations. uS Trade representative ambassador 
Michael Froman (2014) put it straightforwardly: ‘By leading on trade, we can promote 
a global order that reflects both our interests and our values.’ The size of the tariff-free 
zone created by TTip would make it attractive for other countries to meet Eu–uS stand-
ards as a way to gain access to their markets.
president obama has got it right: ‘we can’t let countries like China write the rules of 
the global economy. we should write those rules’ (wildau 2015b). For several years 
now the rising economic superpower has been trying to establish alternatives to coun-
ter western dominance in the international financial institutions (Korteweg 2015). while 
China has enjoyed the benefits of the world’s open economies, the country has avoided 
opening its own markets. China will only reassess its policies as the result of exter-
nal pressure. The country has formally asked to join the negotiations on TiSa, which 
is currently being discussed by 24 wTo members. This effort, even though officially 
endorsed by the Eu, is unlikely to succeed due to the political resistance coming from 
some of the TiSa negotiation’s participants (European Commission 2014). instead, the 
Chinese authorities have been advised that the country should ‘play by the rules and 
demonstrate willingness to have a strong agreement’ if it wants to join the negotiations 
(Vieuws.eu 2015).
apart from curbing China’s geostrategic intentions, TTip also has implications for 
the russian dominance of the energy market. after the pressure placed by russia on 
former ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to prevent the signing of the Eu asso-
ciation agreement in Vilnius, the conflict of interests between the Eu and russia was 
followed by russian military intervention in post-Euromaidan ukraine. TTip brings no 
such risks as it does not directly concern russia’s backyard, but the possibility of crude 
oil and natural gas exports from the uS, which is undergoing an energy revolution, will 
move Europe away from dependence on russian hydrocarbons. For a country which 
relies on exploiting the ‘energy rhetoric’ to achieve its political ends, the new-found inde-
pendence of its major gas importer will disarm the Kremlin at its core.
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ideally the trade deals currently being negotiated over the atlantic and pacific oceans 
would signal a new era of global trade liberalisation based on high standards for food, 
services, consumer protection and ecology. and the more the actors show a willing-
ness to be involved, the better the chances that high western standards will become 
the global norm. whether this becomes reality, or whether the competition for mar-
kets and strategic preferential trade deals between chosen regions prevails, through 
TTip Europe will be able to safeguard its position among the global leaders and avoid 
isolation.
Conclusion
The initial goal of the Juncker Commission was to conclude talks on TTip under the 
obama administration. The sooner the deal is sealed, the sooner citizens can benefit 
from it. However, in his State of the union speech, president obama made it clear that 
quality cannot be compromised. German Chancellor angela Merkel has stated that at 
least the political and ‘most essential’ parts of the agreement will need to be finalised by 
the end of 2015 (Kroet 2015). For strategic reasons, the most debated points should be 
agreed before the uS presidential elections begin. Much of the progress in the negotia-
tions has been made thanks to obama’s strong advocacy of the agreement. The hype 
surrounding the presidential elections scheduled for november 2016 will consume the 
attention needed for advancing it further. on a positive note, the uS president will be 
able to fast-track trade promotion as the uS Senate has recently approved a six-year 
renewal of this authority. This will make the procedure easier. The bill, voted for in June, 
enables the use of an expedited process to submit trade pacts to Congress.
on the European side, the final document must be approved by all the Eu member 
states’ governments and by a majority in the European parliament. while the legislative 
body has proven able to work towards compromises, national governments that derive 
their power from the opinions of local electorates may be less open to conciliation. How-
ever, indecisiveness and a lack of unity would have deep transatlantic consequences. 
Mutual blame would bring a severe transatlantic split and accelerate dependence on 
other markets. in this scenario, Europe would lag behind the uS in strategic regions 
such as asia or South america. if the two major western democratic blocs cannot suc-
cessfully conclude TTip, it will send a strong signal to the rest of the world, and both 
China and russia would celebrate the cleavage in Eu–uS cooperation. regarding the 
consequences a failure would have within the Eu, the case of the uK is particularly sen-
sitive. Conservative party politicians have sympathy for the union only to the extent that 
it has the ability to bring economic advantages for the country. The timing of the uK’s 
referendum on Eu membership could easily coincide with the final TTip negotiations, 
and any disappointments in the economic arena could be reflected in the British public’s 
attitude.
Sceptics need to keep in mind that TTip is more than a trade deal. it is an opportunity 
to boost Eu–uS relations and bring the western economic model to ever greater promi-
nence. removing trade barriers between the two largest economies will not just provide 
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a post-crisis boost; it will also offer a historic opportunity for Europe to participate in set-
ting new global standards. an ambitious TTip will secure a prominent place for Europe 
in the harshly competitive global economy and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. 
Hesitation will result in Europe playing a secondary role. in a fast-changing environment 
the step-by-step approach is obsolete. when discussing the free trade agreement in 
the plenary session of the European parliament, Chairman of the European people’s 
party, Manfred weber openly stated, ‘Today is the time for political leadership . . . There 
is a trans-pacific trade agreement that is being decided upon, which is going to corner 
a huge percentage of world trade. The world is not going to wait for us to sort out our 
internal debates. we have to be committed and act’ (weber 2015). The sooner the deal 
is sealed, the sooner Europe can benefit from it. with a historic opportunity on Europe’s 
doorstep, now is the crucial time for the union to show committed leadership and take 
the path of progress together.
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